175 At their approach the Finns fled to the forests and engaged in successful guerilla warfare against their invaders. When they returned home they would find their homes in ashes and their fields ruined, but with grim perseverance [648] they kept up their resistance. It is no wonder that in those circumstances there developed in the Finns a mistrust, even a hatred, towards the Russians and everything that was Russian, a feeling that was inherited by each new generation.

175 703 By this time the Finns had begun to achieve universal fame as excellent soldiers and generals. The number of Finnish men in the Swedish army was proportionally much larger than that of the Swedes, and the Finnish units were regarded as striking forces which were

175 leaders then imprisoned in Siberia and in various Russian jails. The most prominent 642 176 of them was the lawyer, P. E. Svinhufvud, who upon his return was made the head of the senate, the temporary government of Finland--there being no Czar or Grand Duke any more. This government took a decisive step on 6 December 1917 proclaiming Finland an independent state free from Russia and appealing to the statement made by Lenin that no nation was to be held by Russia without its own consent. [648] The independence of Finland was first acknowledged by France, then by Sweden, Russia and other European countries, and finally by Great Britain and the United States in May, 1919.

175 669 But it was apparent that Lenin was not going to be true to his promise. Russian troops

175 Finland cannot escape the map. It is a
● 648 borderland, destined to be in dispute between West and East. In the course of centuries Finland has always sided with the West, but every generation has had to pay dearly for it.

121 The most recent developments in the history of Finland with be treated in discussions of political and economic conditions in Subparagraphs 2a and 3a.

668 these movements sometimes showed chauvinsitic
186 tendencies; e. g., a resentment towards Sweden was rife among the Finnish-speaking students as a result of language controversies in their own country. Perhaps because of the isolated position of Finland, there have been few prejudices
[648] against foreigners as individuals. Furthermore, the aversion towards Russia and the Russians has, on the whole, been almost identical with Finnish nationalism.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2e,

Political Background

FOREIGN POLICIES

•648 The main problems in foreign policy Finland has always had with the East, i. e. with Russia. Under the rule of the czars as well as of dictators Finland from the Russian point of view has been an obstacle to westward expansion. The Finns, on the other hand, have been grimly determined to preserve their national existence at any cost, and up to now they have succeeded.

In 1918 Lenin's government acknowledged officially the independence of Finland but did not withdraw the Russian revolutionary troops stationed in the country. These associated themselves with the Finnish Red Guards, so that the Finnish Civil War was a conflict between the Finnish White Government and the Russian

Bosheviks as well. Finland, however, did not participate in the struggle between the White and the Red armies in Russia, but numerous Finnish volunteers, mostly high school and university students, took part in the Estonian War of Independence and in the uprising of the Karelians in the following year. Peace between Finland and Russia was made in 1920 in Tartu. The boundaries of Finland were to be the same as those of the Grand Duchy of Finland under Russian rule, and, in addition, an area at the Arctic Ocean, the district of Petsamo, was acquired. The Russians promised to give East Karelia an autonomous status, and several Finnish Communists moved over and became prominent in the administration of this area. Among the univerisity students the memory of the Karlian struggle was kept alive, and the most

648 883 radical-minded established the Academic Karelia League, which was active until World War II advocating official Finnish intervention in behalf of the Karelians and the annexation of this area to Finland. The ideals of the League, however, were commonly recognized as youthful fanaticism, and accordingly they had very little influence on general opinion, and none whatsoever on Finnish foreign policy.

648 In 1920 Finland became a member of the League of Nations, which very soon had to decide the dispute between Finland and Sweden concerning the ownership of the Aland Islands. During the Finnish War of Independence these islands had been occupied by Swedish troops, and the population, almost entirely Swedish-speaking, had expressed a wish to be connected with Sweden. The League of Nations, however, decided

748 the dispute in favor of Finland, but Åland was to be granted a special autonomous position and guarded against Finnish influence. In view of the strategic importance of this group of islands, it was agreed that Finland could not build any fortresses nor keep any armed forces in this area. Druing World War II Finland proceeded to fortify these islands, but after the armistice the work had to be abandoned, and in the peace treaty the status of Åland remained unchanged. In the early twenties Finland also approached the League of Nations several times on behalf of the Karelians, but nothing was achieved, as Russia at that time was not even a member of the League.

In the years immediately following World War I there was some interest in approaching the border states, i. e. the Baltic states and

•/48 Poland, which were in a precarious geographical position just as Finland was. From the 1930's, however, a Scandinavian approach was much more popular, by force of similar social and cultural conditions as well as on the basis of common historical tradition. In social and cultural life the co-operation between the Northern Countries has been remarkable, without parallel in any other part of the world, but no treaties or agreements of strategic nature have ever existed. Finland assumed the policy of the Scandinavian neutrality bloc, but in spite of all good hopes it became almost immediately involved in the Second World War, and the other Northern Countries, not wanting to commit themselves, limited their assistance mostly to moral support.

An improvement in relations between Finland and the Soviet Union was noticeable during the

•648 1930's, in spite of the violent anti-Communist movements in the former country. A non-aggression pact was concluded between these two states in 1932, and in 1934 it was extended over ten more years, until 1945. Even when beginning her march into Poland in late September of 1939, the Soviet Union gave assurance that it was not going to interfere with the neutrality of Finland and various other states whose representatives shortly afterwards were invited to Moscow to discuss the establishment of Soviet military bases in their areas. When her turn came to Finland, there was no doubt of the seriousness of the situation. Realistic and pessimistic by nature, the Finns had little doubt that giving way to the Russian requests would mean the end of their independence, of their whole national existence. Never during their history have the Finns

• 648 shown such unanimity, such spirit of sacrifice as during the period preceding the Winter War and in the battle that followed. But they had no desire to expose their country to a formidable one-sided war against a great power with a population fifty times larger than their own. They tried compromise with the Russians, and the negotiations were extended over a long period. The Soviet statesmen declared themselves to be concerned for the safety of Leningrad--which according to their opinion not only required the possession of the Karelian Isthmus but of Petsamo as well--and, to assure themselves against the possibility of Finland being used as a base for an invasion of Russia, they demanded that the Hanko Peninsula on the coast of the Gulf of Finland be rented to the Soviet Union for thirty years as a naval base. Negotiations were

•648 still going on when the Soviet Union abolished the non-aggression pact, and a few days later, November 30, 1939, started an advance to Finnish territory and a bombardment of Finnish cities.

The Winter War brought to the Finns much military fame and the sympathy of the Western world, but material assistance in the form of modern war equipment remained quite inadequate, not to speak of manpower, which was represented by a few thousand volunteers, mostly Scandinavians. A tentative plan of the French and British governments to interfere in Finland's behalf was stranded after Norway and Sweden refused to grant transit to any foreign troops; the Finns themselves had not been very optimistic about the result of the project. So an armistice was made in Moscow March 12, 1940, the

•648 so-called first Peace of Moscow, in which Finland ceded to Russia the Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Viipuri, Ladoga-Karelia, parts of the communes of Salla and Kuusamo in the north, and her share of the peninsula Kalastajasaarento at the Arctic Ocean. The Hanko Peninsula was rented for fifty years.

The months following the treaty of Moscow were precarious for Finland. Not only had she many internal problems to solve, such as the resettling of half a million Karelian refugees, but the political situation abroad grew more and more threatening. After Denmark and Norway had been occupied by the Germans, Finland was cut off from contact with the Western powers. Meanwhile, Russia had annihilated the Baltic states. The only hope for Finland seemed to be in the cooling off of Russo-German relations,

•648 which might give to the country an opportunity to balance between two rival powers. Unlike the small Central European nations the Finns had never been touched by the German expansion, and especially among the educated classes there was much pro-German sentiment, based on centuries-long cultural relations and the assistance received from Germany during the Finnish War of Independence. The totalitarian system, on the other hand, had very few supporters in Finland, alien as it was both to the Finnish mentality and tradition. It seemed more or less the choice between two evils, and Germany seemed the lesser of them. Moreover, because of the loss of the Karelian territory and a failure of crops, Finland faced a famine which could be avoided only by German help. As a safeguard, Finland granted transit through her area to the German

•648 troops, an indication that in case of a Russo-German conflict Finland had very little possibility of not becoming involved.

At any rate, when the war flashed up again in midsummer, 1941, the Finns still continued their own separate struggle with Russia, apart from the conflict between the big powers. All the Finns wished for the restoration of their lost territory, while some hoped that East Karelia would be united with Finland. Although Great Britain declared war on Finland, this did not lead to any military measures, and the Finns never felt or even remembered that they were supposed to be at war with the English.

The renewed struggle began with success for Finnish arms: Karelia was reoccupied, most of the evacuees returned to their homes, and the Finnish frontier was pushed all the way to

•648 Lake Onega in the east. But after Germany had begun to lose the battle on its eastern frontier, Russian pressure against the Finnish lines, especially on the Karelian Isthmus, grew too heavy to resist. In the early part of 1944 Finland tested the possibility of a separate armistice with Russia, but the Russian requirements were overwhelming, especially in war reparations. In June of the same year the President of Finland, Risto Ryti, asked for German help on the Karelian front and on his own responsibility made an agreement according to which Finland would not conclude a separate peace with Russia. In August Ryti, however, resigned, and Mannerheim, the new president again started negotiations with Russia. The result was the second peace of Moscow in September, 1944. This was even more devastating than the first one,

648 including the loss of all the reoccupied territory plus the Petsamo area at the Arctic Ocean, and the release of the Porkkala Peninsula, only about a dozen miles southwest of Helsinki. The requirements for war reparations were mitigated, but still seemed too heavy for any country to cope with; German troops in Finland had to be disarmed and all property belonging to Germany and its allies had to be turned over to the Soviet Union. German troops in northern Finland were offered a free retreat before the armistice, but they refused, and the result was a short but bitter battle in Lappland in the fall of 1944, which resulted in the complete devastation of this area.

An Allied Control Commission in Helsinki supervised the carrying out of armistice terms until September, 1947, when the Peace Treaty

•648 concluded in Paris in February of the same year took effect. The Paris Peace Treaty only confirmed the terms concluded in Moscow two and a half years previously. The total area lost by Finland amounted to 43, 864 square kilometers (or 17, 704 square miles), and the war reparations to 300, 000, 000 dollars, according to the level of prices in 1938.

After World War II the position of Finland has been precarious, to say the least, but up to now the country has managed to retain its sovereignty and to remain outside the major power coalitions. In April, 1948, an Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was concluded in Moscow on the initiative of the Soviet Government. According to it, Finland, in case it becomes the base of an attack against the USSR "by Germany or any power allied with

•648 her," is obliged to defend its territory, with the help of the USSR, if necessary. Moreover, both parties affirmed the agreement included in the Paris Treaty, according to which they will refrain from participating in any coalitions or treaties directed against the other nation.

After World War II Scandinavian co-operation has further developed in social and cultural life, but any agreements of a strategic nature have been out of the question. According to prevailing opinion, the neutrality of Sweden is extremely important for Finland's independence. It is assumed by many that if Sweden should join the North Atlantic Pact, the result would be the immediate occupation of Finland by Russian forces.

The relations between the United States and Finland have always been friendly, but due to

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•148 the faraway position of Finland, no questions of a strategic nature have ever arisen.

Being a small country, Finland in her international relations has always tried to settle delicate questions with the help of negotiation and compromise and to avoid force or coercion of any kind. The history of Finland provides ample evidence of the fact that this has not always succeeded.

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[For a brief interpretation of Finno-Soviet relations arising from Soviet Russia's policies toward Scandinavia as a whole, but with specific reference to Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and the Russification of Finno-Ugrian minorities under Soviet control, including Soviet "annexation" of the Finnish national epic, the Kalevala, see 21: Kolarz, Rl Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 88-103. Bibliographic notes appear on pp. 86-87.]